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Even for so highly differentiated a product as cars, voluntary
export restraints do not protect domestic industries or consum-
ers. Demand is deflected to unrestrained third countries, the
restrained exporter upgrades quality, and consumers end up
paying more.
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The voluntary export restraints (VERs) that the Fourth, between 1979 and 1986 French,
U.K., France,;and Germany negotiated with German, and Japanese producers supplied an
Japanese automakers show why VERs do not increasingly similar product mix on the French
protect domestic industries and probably end up car market, whereas the Italians created a
costing consumers more. distinctly different type of product.
First, most EC countries followed suit after Fifth, in 198/. and 1985 the quota raised auto
the British negotiation with Japan in 1976 (the prices in France about 9%, costing French
domino effect). consumers about 320 nillion francs and saving
only about 300 jobs.
Second, the VERs did not arrest import
penetration by third countries. When Japanese This paper is a product of the Trade Policy
imports were restricted, the French simply Division, Country Economics Department.
bought Italian and German cars. Copies are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.
Third, the Japanese upgraded the quality of Please contact Sheila Fallon, room N8061,
cars sold on the French market between 1981 extension 61680.
and 1983. (The VER was not strictly binding in
France until 1984 and in Germany until 1985.)
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11. Introdetion
Nodf-tariff barriers (NTBs), including voluntary export
restraints (VERs)" are on the rise. For GATT members, they provide a
way to circumvent the spirit of the membership without directly
confronting the Agreement to which member countries ascribe. Much the
same applies to EC members: VERs by individual members allow them to
circumvent the CET ani Community policies while providing immediate
relief to domestic producers. This paper examines how the car markets
in France, the UK, and West Germany adjusted to the imposition by
their governments of restrictions on imports of Japanese autos.
Theoretical studies (Falvey, 1979; Rodriguez, 1979) suggest
that quotas and VERs will lead to quality upgrading within the
quantity-constrained categories. These predictions have found
empirical support for studies of NTBs in footwear (Aw and Roberts,
1986, 1987) and autos (Feenstra, 1984, 1985). Rents resulting from
NTBs will accrue to distributors in the importing countries in the
case of an import quota and to producers in the exporting country in
the case of a VER. This is the usual outcome because retailing is
usually competitive and governments rarely auction off license
permits. In addition, unlike a price measure, a quantitative
restriction may affect market structureArendering it less competitive.I
Finally, for relatively homogeneous commodities,
NTBs are porous (Baldwin, 1982).
For cars, detecting the effects of VERs is complicated by the
organizational structure of the European car industry, by currency
realignments, and by product differentiation. Firct, the distribution
and sale of cars in the EC markets is highly rigid. 1/ Second,
2evidence frdm U.S. unit value indexes of car (and machinery) imports
from Germanfy strongly suggest the presence of "pricing to market"
(PTM). PTM occurs when firms do not pass through exchange rate
changes into their export prices. 2/ Given that exchange rates
fluctuated among EC members, this creates an identification problem
since a higher car price in, say France, during the period when the
VER was in effect could reflect the devaluation of the Franc against
the yen rather than the effect of the VER. Finally, the car industry
is characterized by extreme product differentiation. Product
differentiation and recognizable brand names certainly render it
impossible to bypass the restraint via transhipment thr%'1h third
countries as in the case of homogeneous products like st, / In
this sense it is easier to analyze the effects of VERs. b .-roduct
differentiation also requires estimates of the price elasticities of
demand by country of origin which are difficult to obtain. A/
To deal with these complications, we approach the analysis
first at the industry, then at the product level. Section 2 surveys
the restrictions on automobile trade. Section 3 examines the patterns
of trade diversion at the aggregate level. In section 4, analysis of
a sample of cars sold on the French and German markets during 1979-85
establishes that the VER was binding in France during 1984 and 1985,
but never in Germany. The same panel data is used in section 5 to
further analyze the change in product mix sold on the French market
using multilateral index numbers. The indexes show a move towards a
similar product mix for French, Japanese, and German cars and a
divergent trend for Italy. Conclusions follow in section 6.
32. Restrict-tons on Automobile Trade
PriTce and non-price restrictions on automobile trade among
major developed country producers and coasumers is summarized in Table
1. It is apparent that, with the exception of the Italian-Japanese
agreement, up until the mid 70's, trade was only hampered by moderate
tariffs ranging from 3% in the U.S. to 10.3% in the EC. Because the
bilateral agreement between Japan and Italy is so restrictive (about
2,000 cars exchanged) and has been in place for so long, we will not
analyze the implications of that restraint. l/
A turn occurred in 1976 when the British Carmakers
Association (SNMT) and the corresponding Japanese organization (JAMfA)
agreed to limit the market share of Japanese cars (in units) in
British apparent consumption to 11%. At the time, as shown in Table
2, Japanese penetration in Britain was three times higher than in
France and Gormany and equal to that in the U.S. This Anglo-Japanese
agreement triggered a succession of measures. In 1977, the President
of France publicly announced that France would not tolerate a Japanese
market share exceeding 3% (in units) of French apparer.t consumption.
This domino effect spread to the U.S. where a petition for import
relief on passenger cars was (unsuccessfully) lodged by the UAW in
August 1980.
4By L981, these threats on Japanese imports materialized. In
France thne agreement was implemented in 1980. Following the
unsuccessful attempt at introducing a bill imposing a quota, the US
chose to negotiate a VER: on May 1, 1981, Japan announced a 3-year
system of VERs on the export of passenger cars to the US market. In
June 1981, Japan agreed to limit exports (in units) to the Benelux
countries to their 1980 level. With Germany, Japan agreed not to
raise its share in German apparent consumption by more than i% per
year. Finally, in 1985, Sweden introduced some kind of "surveillance"
or. car imports from Japan.
Were the VERs binding? Table 2 shows the evolution of
Japan's share in apparent consumption for major industrialized
countries. Sweden and Switzerland are included as raference countries
since quantitative restrictions were either absent (Switzerland) or
started later (Sweden). The US is included since it represents
approximateLy half of Japanese car exports. The data show that the
11% quota was filled for Great Britain virtually every year. For
France, the figures suggest that the quota was not strictly binding
before 1984. For Germany, the quota allowed for approximately a
yearly 1% increase in Japan's share in apparent consumption (exact
figures in parenthesis in Table 2). The aggregatb figures suggest
that the quota was not strictly binding over the period. Finally,
note the 1977 French "announcement" effect. It would appear that the
5threat of fbrthcoming restrictions led tow Japanese to shift supply
away from French to German markets during 1978 and 1979.
3. Country Substitution Effe~.,.
Because the VER has 'U, n source specific, we can analyze the
effect of the quantitative restriction on resource allocation by
considering only three countries: the home country having negotiated
the VER; a partner country (EC or EFTA); the outside country with whom
the VER has been negotiated (Japan). For expository purposes assume
that the home country is small enough so that the supply price for
cars from abroad is perfectly elastic over the relevant range.
Competition prevails before and after the introduction of the VER. §/
For now all cars are perfect substitutes.
Figure 1 shows that under free trade QoQl cars are imported,
of which QOQ2 are originated in the partner country. The introduction
of a VER reducing imports from the outside country to Q3Q4 leads to an
increase in domestic supply and to increased imports from the partner
(trade diversion). The partner increases his surplus by areas (1) +
(2). The global resource allocation loss from the VER is area (3).
Note that a tariff which would achieve the same increase in domestic
supply would only lead to a resource allocation loss equivalent to
area (1). Consumers lose area (5). Since the VER is administered by
the exporting country, there is a rent transfer equal to area (4).
6Howver, because cars are highly differentiated, one cannot
show the tfade diversion effects towards the partner in a single
diagram. However, maintaining the small country assumption for home
country exports, one can show how equilibrium in the domestic car
industry will be affected by a VER. Figure 2, quadrant 1 gives the
derived demand for domest'.c ars which will shift in response to a
changL in the relative price of partners (pP) and the third country
(pJ). Quadrant 3 represents domestic supply as a family of 450 lines
where P is the weighted price the domestic producer obtains from
selling cars in the domestic market (pd) and abroad (pe). 7/ For a
given supply, shown as a 450 'tne in quadrant 3, the proportion of
cars sold domestically will be an increasing function of the relative
price obtained in the market (pd/pe). Initial equilibrium is at Qo
where, Sod - Dgd.
Suppose that after taking into account the shifts in demand
towards partners, the VER (PJ> pJ) shifts out the demand for domestic
cars to D1. LI Then at the previous set of prices, there is excess
demand, EDO. This excess demand can be eliminated by the combination
of an increase in supply (PO -> pl) and a diversion of sales to the
domestic market. Another way to eliminate the excess demand is the
fall in demand caused by the higher price. Neglecting changes in
inventories, if there is some supply response, the new equilibrium
will be at Ql with a higher domestic market relative price. The
7outcome witt respect to exports will depend on a number of factors.
For example,r if export supply is strong, or if subsidies are provided
to export sales at the samc time as the VER, one might see an increase
in the share of export sales following the introduction of the VER.
The effect of introducing product differentiation has an
ambiguous effect on welfare. If cars supplied by EC partners have
similar characteristics and quality as Japanese cars, then the
ccnsumer welfare cost of the VER will be low and the rent transfer
will be low. On the other hand, if previously exported cars are now
directed to the domestic market, then there will be little supply
response. Finally, regardless of differentiation, the relative
elasticities of supply in the home and partner country will affect the
extent of welfare loss.
Table 3 shows total car registrations, domestic market share,
production growth and export shares for France, Germany and the UK.
First, it is clear from new registrations that demand started to
decline in 1980 in all three countries as a result of the recession.
Demand picked up again in 1983 for Germany and the UK while for France
due to the expansionary policies of the Socialist government, the two
peak years were 1982 and 1983. Second, the domestic market share in
apparenc consumption was declining in all three countries,
particularly in France and the UK around the years of the negotiation
of the VER. The VER did not stop the decline in France, nor in the
UK. Third, while the UK car industry continued its decline with
r.ngative growth and declining export share, export share rose in
France in response to fiscal incentives to exporters, in spite of
three years of negative production growth. In sum, at the aggregate
8level, tl.e VERS did not achieve the results expectee. by the domestic
car industry, i.e. a resumption of growth and an iwcrease in donestic
market share.
4. The Impact of Restrictions on JaRanese Car Prices
The data in table 2 suggest that the VERs imposed by EC
countries on Japan can be split between non-binding and binding
countries. For example the VER appears binding in France startii.-
around 1984, but not in Germany. If this is the case, then the pri -
of an ,iual "quality" Japanese car in France should be higher in years
when the quota is binding than in years when it is not. Also, in
Germany, changes in the price of Japanese cars should be entirely
explained by changes in quality.
To test this hypothesis, we constructed a sample of French,
Italian, German and Japanese cars sold in France during 1979-85. This
sample consists of all major car models defined in terms of
horsepower, maximum speed, engine size, length, width, weight, and
fiscal horsepower but not in terms of interior characteristics.
However, price and sales data may distinguish across the complete set
of characteristics (e.g. distinguish between a Citroen CX-Pallas and a
Citroen CX-Prestige). We consistently chose price and sales data for
the models with highest sales. Our sample therefore covers
approximately 60% of French car sales and 50% of foreign car sales
each year. We also collected the pi. e data for the same Japanese car
models sold in Germany during the same period.
9Tsfng the Lancasterian approach, we assume that quality is
defined by- a continuum of characteristics, X, and that these
characteristics are reflected in prices. 2/ Observed prices will
depart from prices predicted by characteristics when there are sharp
changes in availability. Following the semi-logarithmic formulation
successtully est;mated in the literature, this approach suggests the
following statistical model:
7
(1) ln Pa t ° + ks cX,, + tz z Dt tPM, 0 k fik"i^t t-2 
where the error terms vt are assumed to have the usual properties; c
is a superscript for the supplying country; m is an index varying over
models; k is an index varying over characteristics; and Dt is a dummy
taking a value of 1 in year t, and zero otherwise. The dummy
variables are expected to capture sharp changes in availability. For
example a shortage of Japanese cars in year t would result in a
significantly positive coefficient for 7t.
Table 4 gives the final results from estimating (1) after
selecting the most significant common characteristics over the sample.
As in previous studies, the characteristics show the expected positive
signs when significant, and the model accounts for most of the
variation in the models' list prices expressed in constant Francs or
10
"onstant Deutschmarks. (Deflation is by the French CPI for cars sold
in France an?d by the German CPI for cars sold in Germany.)
More interestingly, the dummy variables are significant for
Jepanese cars sold in the French market during 1984 and 1985 when the
data on apparent consumption suggested a strictly binding quota. On
the other hand, no year dummy variables fo; Japanese cars sold in the
German market are significanc, cornfirming the impression gathered from
the data on apparent consumption. Interestingly, note also the
significant negative year coefficient for Germany in 1980, 1981 and
1983, and to a lesser extent for Germany in 1982 and Italy in 1981.
These years correspond to tnk period when these two countries raised
significantly their sales in France in response to stagnating home
demand. This change in pricing is not surprising in view of the
retailing structure of the EC automobile market described in the
introduction which allegedly makes possible market segmentation.
The robustness of the fixed effects detected in the
regressions was checked by heteroscedasticity and sensitivity tests.
First we tested for heteroscedasticity across year: using the Bartlett
test. We accepted the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 1%
significance level for all countries. Next, we pooled all
observations across years for each country and tested again for
heteroscedasticity. This time the Bartlett test detected
heteroscedasticity, so we performed the appropriate correction. O1Q
The corrected coefficients for the year dummies were well within one
standard error of the original estimates. Coefficient and standard
error estimates in Table 4 are those after correction for
heteroscedasticity.
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We&also performed two sensitivity tests. The first concerned
the stability of the year dummy coefficients vis-a-vis the choice of
characteristics. We found that omitting each characteristic one-by-
one never changed the year dummy coefficient values by more than one
standard error, except for the Japanese hedonic regression on the
French market where the coefficients of the dummies for 1984 and 1985
changed by 1.3 standard error when the horsepower variable was
deleted. The second test concerned the stability of the
characteristics coefficients to the period specifications, since these
coefficients are used later on to compute price and quality indexes.
We re-estimated (1) for three different subperiods (79-81, 82-83, and
84-85) and found that the F-test for coefficient stability was
accepted. 11/
Following Feenstra (1985), we use predicted prices from the
estimation of (1), excluding the year dummies, to construct average
unit quality values (in current Francs) for Japanese cars sold in
France. These values are reported in Table 5 where they are compared
with observed unit values from our sample. The difference between the
two values thus represents the price effect of the quota. Unit value
increase by 31% between 1981 and 1983 and by 15% between 1983 and 1985
and unit quality by 29% between 1981 and 1983 and by 6% between 1983
and 1985. In other words, quality change accounts for almost 100% of
the price change between 1981 and 1983 but only for 40% of the price
rise between 1983 and 1985. Since Feenstra (1984, 1985) also detected
quality upgrading in the much more important US market (see table 2),
it may be that the obser'ed quality upgrading was due to the US VER
rather than to the French VER.
12
Since the VER was apparently binding starting around 1984, we
make an approximate calculation of consumer welfare loss during that
year. Taking into account the effects of changes in quality the
welfare loss is approximated by:
2) Aw - (Pi - PO) S1 + _ (P1 - PO) (So - S1)
where Si - xi Qi is services defined in terms of quantity, Qi times
unit quality, xi; Pi is unit service price; and subscripts 0 and 1
refer to 1984 values in the absence and in the presence of restricted
services. With a demand elasticity of 2 (3), and assuming a VER-
induced price rise of 9.6% the welfare loss is 320 (337) million FF
and the number of cars restrained at 13,000 (20,000) units. Since the
portion of the price increase attributed to quality upgrading was
excluded from the welfare calculation, our estimates are lower than
alternative ones which would attribute the entire price increase to
the effect of the quota.
To calculate employment effects, assume that the overall
demand elasticity for cars is unity so that the additional income
spent on French or EC cars because of the VER in 1984 was
approximately 330 (655) million FF. Making the further strong
assumption that this additional expenditure fell entirely on French
cars, we obtain an upper bound estimate of the increase in production
13
of about 5400 (10700) units in 1984 since the average French car price
in that yeaf was 61000 FF. Finally applying the labor coefficient of
0.06 men per car produced (Messerlin and Becuwe, 1987) gives the upper
bound estimate of 324 (642) jobs saved in 1984. D2
We mentioned in the introduction evidence of pricing to
market (PTM) of German cars in the US market during the period of
strong dollar appreciation. To check for the presence of PTM and to
verify our claim that the VER was not binding in Germany, we compare
the evolution of the (unweighted) average price of 11 common models
sold in Switzerland, Germany and France during 1979-85 after deflating
each price index by the local currency/yen index. In Switzerland
there are no quantitative restrictions on Japanese car imports.
Furthermore the Mark and Swiss Franc currencies moved closely together
depreciating cumulatively by 48% and 36% respectively vis-a-vis the
yen whereas the French Franc depreciated by 94%.
Table 6 shows the evolution of these indexes. Note first
that the average yen price of these models is 17% higher in France and
14% higher in Germany in 1979 than in Switzerland. This is because
the sales tax in Switzerland is lower than the VAT in Germany (15%)
and in France (33%). Next, if one can assume that the elasticity of
supply is infinite over the relevant range (a plausible first
assumption in view of the small share in Japanese exports for these
markets and the simultaneous VER in the US), 1W/ then if there is no
14
PTM and the restriction is not binding, the three indexes should not
depart too iiuch from 1. The data show that the indexes for Germany
and Switzerland move closely together and do not depart much from
unity over the entire period. On the other hand, the index for
Japanese cars sold in France has consistently a higher value and
increases in value in 1985. Note that the index is also increasing in
value for Germany but not for Switzerland, suggesting that the quota
may have become binding in Germany starting in 1985. Since there were
no restrictions on the Swiss market, we have here further evidence
that the French restriction was binding, but no evidence of PTM.
5. Product Mix ComRarisons Based on Multilateral Index Numbers
Now we shall use the same sample of cars of French, German,
Italian and Japanese origins sold in France during the period 1979-85
and classify cars into k - 1, ... , 8 categories according to their
fiscal horsepower. I4/ Within each supplying country, we now assume
that cars can be treated as belonging to a number of distinct
categories. Thus, within each supplying country, cars are now assumed
to be perfect substitutes within each horsepower category, i.e.
quality is a variable that is discreetly varied. Then, the relative
demand for cars of different categories only depends on their relative
prices and a VER will always lead to quality upgrading, i.e. there is
a shift of imports towards the higher-priced category (Falvey, 1979).
This is because the VER leads to a specific rise in prices which means
a smaller percentage rise for the higher quality cars. With an ad-
valorem tariff there would be no change in quality since the relative
price of imports is not affected.
15
Relying on the theory of index numbers developed by Caves,
Christensen and Diewert (1982), and following Aw and Roberts (1987),
we construct multilateral price indexes that allow us to compare price
and product mix indexes between different supplying countries and
across time under the assumption that product mix change is reflected
by a change in fiscal horsepower. LW Assume that the price per unit
of service of bundle i is equal to the average price per unit of
quantity, pi, divided by the level of quality, Ai. The representative
consumer's utility is represented by a translog utility function. He
faces fixed prices and minimizes the expendituse on car purchases
(assumed separable from other elements in his utility function)
subject to a fixed level of utility. Then it can be shown that the
relationship between any two bundles i and j where i and j may refer
to a country, c, or a time period, t, can be written as:
(3) ln p-' - in pJ - ln Ai - ln AJ + ln p*ij
where
E Vkc
(4) pi - k
k k
is the unit value of bundle i, in country c in time period t, k - 1,
... 8 has been defined above, c - 1, ...4, is the country index; Q and
V are quantitied and values; Ai is the product mix index, here
measuring a change from one fiscal horsepower category to another; and
16
ln p*ij is the product-mix-adjusted Tornqvist multilateral price index
defined by':
(5) lnp * i (n i-ln p
ii Z(sk + ln
k (sk sk) (ln Pk - Pk)
where ' and ln Pk are the cost shares and logarithmic prices for a
hypothetical base observation, so that a comparison between two
observations is the difference between the bilateral comparison
between each observation and the base. The cost and prices for the
hypothetical observation are given by:
(6) -s, ' ~ ix1 Nsi i Vkc
Nki- k E Qkc
k
-np 1~ N i
N i-i
where N is an index over countries and time for a given commodity kg.
As shown by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) the resulting
indexes are superlative i.e., have the property of transitivity which
bilateral indexes lack, and allow to make comparisons across supplying
countries.
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The; unit values for each country appearing in the left-hand
country coldin in table 7 capture both differences in car prices as
well as differences in product mix across time and country
observations. If the mix of products supplied by each source remains
stable over time but varies substantially across countries, then
cross-country comparisons using unit-value indexes will be distorted.
If the importance of supplying countries varies over time, there will
be a further distortion in unit values comparisons that treat all
commoditios from all countries as homogenous.
The translog multilateral price indexes correct for cross-
section and time-series differences in the mix of cars supplied. They
show that Italy and Japan remain the low cost suppliers but that
Germany's price which was 18% above Japan's price in 1979 is only 7%
above Japan's in 1985. On the other hand, France's price which was 6%
above Japan's price in 1979 is still 5% above Japan's price in 1985.
The translog price indexes for Italy, Germany and France grow
significantly faster than the corresponding unit values due to a
compositional shift towards cars with lower horsepower. On the
contrary, there is no significant difference in the growth rates of
the unit value and translog price indexes for Japan.
Next, consider the evolution of the product mix indexes.
They measure the average flow of services per unit of sale for each
bundle relative to Japan in 1979. These indexes show a move towards a
similar product mix for Japanese, German and French cars. Indeed, the
three product mix indexes are very close to one another by 1985. This
could be interpreted as increased competition among the three
countries as they offer a more similar product mix. In 1979 the
18
situation wa' quite different since Japanese cars were competing with
Italian cars and to a lesser extent with French cars. On the other
hand, Italian cars shift progressively towards a lower horsepower mix.
Of course, Italian cars may have displaced competition in the lower
horsepower range precisely because of their higher quality products in
the lower horsepower range.
Finally, consider the pattern of product mix change for
Japanese cars. In Section 4, we found evidence that the French quota
on Japanese cars became binding in 1984 and 1985. We would therefore
expect quality upgrading during those years. If one now interprets
the product mix index as a quality index, this is confirmed by the
figures in Table 7 which indicate a mild shift towards a higher
horsepower mix in 1985. Since an important fall in horsepower mix
occurred in the other three countries, we would have further evidence
of a relative increase in quality by Japanese carmakers. 1§/
6. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed implications of the UK, French and
German VERs negotiated with Japanese carmakers. Comparisons of import
shares with countries that did not enter into VERs with Japan suggest
that Japanese market shares would have been higher in the absence of
the VERs in the UK but not in Germany until 1985. Inspection of
aggregate unit values also indicate that the domestic share in
apparent consumption was declining in all three countries during the
years immediately before the VER and that the decline continued after
the VER entered into effect. Thus market share was captured by
countries not affected by the VER.
19
- Furher analysis is provided by hedonic regressions for a
sample of French, Italian, German, and Japanese cars sold in France
during 1979-85. Observed prices of Japanese cars sold in France
exceed prices predicted by characteristics during 1984 and 1985 but
not in earlier years when price increases reflected quality upgrading.
On the other hand, in Germany, observed Japanese prices do not exceed
predicted prices during the entire sample period. As a further
check, price comparisons were extended for a subs6t of Japanese models
sold to Switzerland, a country with no quantitative restraint on
Japanese autos. As expected, the average price of the same models
sold in Germany and Switzerland followed a similar trend, while the
average price of these same models was higher in France after netting
out the effect of currency realignments.
Multilateral price indexes for cars sold on the French market
indicate a significant change in product mix offered by different
suppliers. Defining changes in product mix in terms of shifts between
fiscal horsepower categories, the multilateral indexes indicate that
by 1985 France, Germany, and Japan were offering similar product
mixes, while Italy was offering a product mix that had shifted towards
lower horsepower categories. Thus, insofar as offering similar
product mixes is an indication of competition, it would appear that
competition has intensified between France, Germany, and Japan.
20
Footnotes
All producers conclude exclusive agreements with dealers as they
refuse to sell to customers other than their official dealers
who in return do not trade cars from more than one producer
without the producer's agreement. Using cross-section data for
1983, Mertens and Ginsburg (1985) give evidence that car
producers have been able to segment the European market into
submarkets by showing that "equal quality" car price indexes
vary greatly across EC countries (Belgium - 100, France - 117,
Germany - 123, Italy - 132, U.K. - 144).
2.1 Krugman (1985) gives evidence based on unit export values
suggesting that PTM by German firms in the US during the dollar
appreciation was particularly strong for the machinery and
transport equipment sectors. Since the yen appreciated against
European currencies when the VEL was in effect, one cannot rule
out the possibility that this appreciation was not reflected in
higher prices on EC markets.
2/ The current U.S. VER on steel imports is somewhat porous since
(small) amounts of finished steel products are currently
imported from a number of countries with no steel mills. See
Crandall (1987). Investing in the EC countries is not a bypass
for the auto VER sin'e Japanese producers would have to use 80%
domestic content to receive EC treatment. However, some
Japanese firms (e.g. Honda-Rover 200) are currently producing
their own models under British brand names.
_/ The standard estimation approach assumes an otherwise homogenous
good that is only differentiated by country of origin (the
Armington assumption). This makes little sense in the case of
cars where products should be grouped according to their
characteristics and not only according to their origin. Thus
only a subset of products compete with one another. Levinsohn
(1986) develops a methodology based on the Lancasterian approach
to consumer demand to determine empirically the neighbors for
each of 100 cars sold in the U.S. market. This approach allows
him to successfully estimate own and cross-price elasticities of
demand for his sample.
5_1 This agreement, in date since 1952, was initiated by the
Japanese who feared penetration by small Italian cars.
§/ Viewing the car industry in terms of a duopoly, Harris (1985)
argues that a VER will benefit both the home and foreign car
producers subject to the VER. Dixit (1987) and Laussel et al.
(1988) analyze optimal trade policy for the US and EC auto
industries under imperfect market structures. In general, our
analysis does not suggest strong restraining effects of the
VERs, nor a move towards more imperfect market structures as a
result of the VERs.
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71 pe istthe domestic currency price of selling abroad. Since car
produqprs can effectively segment the home market, they can sell
the same product at different prices at home and abroad.
Alternatively, cars can be considered as different from cars
sold abroad. In that case, the 450 lines would be replaced by a
family of convex (to the origin) curves.
if For example, for the U.S., Levin3ohn's (1986) estimates based on
a characteristics approach to consumer demand for cars indicate
a price elasticity of demand for U.S. autos with respect to a 1%
increase in the price of Japanese cars of .18 when substitution
by consumers towards other foreign cars is accounted for. When
this substitution is not allowed for, the estimated price
elasticity of demand is .36.
_/ This approach was pioneered by Griliches (1971) and has been
recently applied by Feenstra (1984, 1985) to study the impact of
the US VER on Japanese cars.
.2/ After sorting observations by horsepower, we subdivided the
sample into eight subgroups and deflated each subgroup variables
by its subgroup variance.
V/ The computed F-statistic for testing the stability of the
characteristic coefficients of the hedonic regression for the
Japanese cars sold in France is 0.009.
12.! These results are similar to Feenstra (1984). A more plausible
calculation would assume a cross price elasticity of demand for
French cars of 0.2 as suggested by the econometric work of
Levinsohn (1986). In that case, the additional income spent on
French cars would be 66 (131) million FF, and 65 (131) jobs
would be saved.
2/ Since the specifications for sale in the US market were
different from those on European markets, assuming that cars can
be modified at no extra cost for sale on the European market is
only a rough approximation.
.1X The categories are CV < 5; CV - 5; CV - 6; CV - 7;, CV - 8;
CV - 9; CV - 10; CV 2 11; where CV is fiscal horsepower. Fiscal
horsepower is related to engine size and RPM. Within each
category we construct a unit value index from the models in that
category. Insofar as the individual categories do not represent
homogenous cars, then a changing mix of cars within each class
will appear only as a price change so that the resulting measure
of product mix change will understate the extent of product mix
change that occurred.
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IV FiscaF horsepower is a formula that involves a nonlinear
relatlonship based on engine rotation speed. Since engine
performance within each fiscal class improved over the period,
this discrete quality measure is crude. However, a regression
over 1979-85 of fiscal horsepower on the characteristics u ed in
the hedonic regressions accounts for 73% (Italian cars), 92%
(Japanese cars) and 95% (French and German cars) of the
variance. This suggests that fiscal horsepower is also an
adequate proxy for quality.
1§/ These results must, however, be viewed cautiously because of the
difficulty of matching sales price data with published car
characteristics so that a relatively small number of models are
included in each horsepower category. As a result, we only
capture approximately half of sales volume in each horsepower
category.
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Table 1 (continsd)
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Japanese Penetration in Some OECD Markets t1970-1986)
Share of
Japanese Passengsr Car Share in Apparent Consumption* Jap rncse xports
United Nether- Switzer- United to to
Y*.,Wz Franca Germany+ Kingdom Belgium lands Sweden land States USA EC
1970 0.2 0.1 0.1 4.9 3.1 0.7 5.8 3.7 44.6 N.A
1972 0.4 0.4 3.0 10.0 9.5 2.8 13.7 5.7 41.9 N.A
1974 0.8 1.3 6.4 15.7 13.1 5.1 9.0 9.0 39.6 14.6
1975 1.5 1.7 9.0 16.5 15.5 6.5 8.4 9.4 39.0 17.5
1976 2.7 1.9 9.4 18.0 16.8 8.2 5.8 9.3 41.4 18.0
1977 2.6 2.5 10.6 19.3 19.8 10.4 12.1 12.4 45.3 16.3
1978 1.8 3.7 11.0 17.9 19.0 9.7 12.6 12.0 46.3 17.6
1979 2.2 5.6 10.8 18.0 19.5 10.0 16.0 16.8 49.9 19.7
1980 2.9 10.4 11.9 24.7 25.7 12.1 23.2 21.3 46.1 19.2
1981 2.6 10.0 11.0 25.0 24.4 13.7 27.2 21.8 44.6 17.2
1982 2.9 9.8 (11.0) 11.0 21.5 22.4 15.2 26.7 22.6 44.9 17.0
1983 2.7 10.6 (12.1) 10.7 22.5 23.5 15.2 27.4 20.9 44.6 20.0
1984 3.0 12.0 (13.3) 11.1 20.1 22.0 15.0 24.5 18.3 46.5 19.9
1985 3.1 13.3 (14.6) 10.9 19.8 22.3 16.1 25.5 20.1 50.1 17.9
1986 3.0 15.0 (16.1) 11.1 20.8 24.3 20.9 26.7 24.0 51.4 20.4
Souroe: CSCA Chmbre Syndicals des Constructeurs Automobiles.
J-MA Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association.
MVMA Motor Vehicle Manufacturer Association.
Various Lsues.
Notes:
* Japanese new car registrations divided by total now car registrations.
+ Figures in parentheses indicate market share (St) negotiatod under the VER. The formula is
St 581a (1.1)t t 1 I.. 4.
Tcble 3
Total Car Registrations Dome"tic Market Shar / Growth Rate Total Export in X of
(In ailione of unite) X of Production (X) Production
United United United United
Yar. France Germany Kingdo Fronc Germany KingJbm France Gormany Kingd" France ormany Klng*ilb
1974 1.52 1.69 1.21 506.9 166.0 286.6 -- -- - 62.5 60.1 86.6
1975 1.40 2.10 1.19 271.2 178.7 166.6 -5.7 2.4 -17.4 58.5 50.3 40.7
1976 1.65 2.81 1.20 207.7 170.6 146.4 17.0 22.0 5.2 60.5 51.6 $7.2
1977 1.90 2.56 1.82 281.9 l66.9 90.8 5.0 6.9 -0.4 52.4 61.2 55.6
1976 1.94 2.66 1.59 244.6 149.2 96.6 0.6 2.6 -7.9 50.6 49.0 6.1
1970 1.97 2.62 1.71 227.0 146.5 61.6 8.5 1.1 -12.5 52.7 60.8 #8.8
1900 1.37 2.42 1.61 177.5 186.8 76.4 -6.6 -10.5 -18.7 52.1 58.2 87.6
1to1 1.U 2.88 1.46 188.8 146.0 64.4 -11.1 1.6 8.8 58.4 54.6 81.0
1962 2.05 2.16 1.55 107.4 157.4 66.5 6.8 5.1 -7.0 52.7 u8.s 25.4
19U 2.01 2.42 1.79 106.6 126.8 66.5 6.8 8.1 17.7 54.6 56.4 22.7
19 4 1.75 2.89 1.74 90.3 115.0 71.6 -8.4 -2.8 -18.0 56.4 U6.9 21.1
1906 1.76 2.57 1.68 0.5 187.9 71.0 -a.0 0.9 15. U.5 61.6 19.8
Notes:
pj shmstlc mrke t sare I de flod an (total car registratioe - Imports) + Imports.
Table 4
He&nic Reagessions by SupDlying Cguntries (1979-1985)
Dependent Variabl List Prices in Constant (1979) Francs (Loaarithms)
or in Constant (1979) Marks (Lojarithms)
Fretch maket Geran
Valrables urket
French Geruan italli Jiapames Jiapaiese
Cars Cats Cats Cars Cars
Observations 211 206 101 121 106
12 6.99 0.19 1.00 0.99 1.06
SSI 160.9 108.5 19.3 82.2 14.1
lItercept 8.285 ' 9.212 * 8.245 ' 9.57S * 12.165 *
0.191 0.214 0.284 0.305 0.464
lorsepovel 0.755 * 0.1 * 0.136 * 0.665 * 6.111 *
0.040 0.059 0.0O8 0.011 0.095
weight 0.006 0.035 * 0.010 0.6W * 6.132
0.001 0.012 0.114 0.009 1.013
114th 0.974 ' 0.243 0.892 * -0.088 0.322
0.149 0.268 0.229 0.215 0.290
0-1911 0.012 *S.0818 0.624 -0.021 -0.027
0.020 0.131 0.029 0.025 0.629
D-1911 -1.023 -0.139 * -0.157 -1.002 0.005
0.020 0.138 0.030 0.025 0.131
P-1912 -0.029 -0.051 *0.816 -0.001 0.001
0.020 0.031 0.030 6.Pi; 0.036
0-1913 -0.021 -O.O * -0.030 0.015 -0.001
0.021 0.031 0.029 0.631 0.035
0-1974 0.001 -0.051 -0.605 0.096 0.001
0.021 0.030 0.032 0.035 0.839
D-19IS -0.007 -0.050 0.011 0.072 2 0.016
0.021 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.846
* denotes significance at the 5% lovel.
ggurcss: Auto Journal; Automobile Magazine; HVKA, various issues.
Table 5
Ouality Adiusted Prices
for S le of Ja2anese Car ImRorts in France
:979 1is0 1931 1962 1933 1934 1985
unit Value lFF) 29744 3601 41527 41143 $4319 61722 62176
(t change) ' 20.6 12.6 10.S 16.3 12.1 0.7
No of models 15 17 1I 17 15 16 17
Io of lev fodels 3 0 0 0 2 4
Unit Quality 1FF) 25995 36177 41347 46122 53355 SS416 56355
(t change) t 20.9 11.2 10.7 14.6 3.9 1.6
Japanese cats
lmpotted (units) 48791 62339 51013 61572 55371 55211 5611I
* calculated as the difference in logarithms
Table 6
Price Indexes of Ja2anese Cars in
France. German and Switzerland (1979-1.0) a/
Year France Germany Switzerland
1979 1.0 (1.0) 1.0 (.97) b/ 1.0 (.83) b/
1980 1.17 1.10 1.06
1981 1.05 0.95 .96
1982 1.11 1.05 1.10
1983 1.07 .93 1.01
1984 1.05 .94 .97
1985 1.09 .97 .96
Sources: See text.
A/ Unweighted average of 11 model list prices (inclusive of all taxes)
expressed in local currency deflated by the local currency exchange
rate with respect to the yen.
/ Expressed in yen vis-a-vis French price expressed in yen.
Unit Valuee Prig. amd Oualitw Indexee
(Relative to Jep - 1.0 in 1979)
France Geranny Italy Japan
Toraqviat Torniit Tornqvist Tornqvist
Unit Price Quality Unit Priee Quality Unsit Prieo Quality UnIt Price Quality
Year Value Index Index Value Index Index Value Index Index Value Index Index
1979 1.15 1.06 1.08 1.41 1.16 1.20 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
1960 1.34 1.23 1.09 1.53 1.33 1.15 1.16 1.18 0.99 1.23 1.19 1.04
1961 1.36 1.39 0.99 1.68 1.40 1.20 1.12 1.20 0.93 1.40 1.35 1.03
1982 1.52 1.55 0.99 1.96 1.77 1.11 1.31 1.42 0.92 1.54 1.61 0.96
1983 1.82 1.79 1.02 2.12 1.97 1.08 1.50 1.63 0.92 1.83 1.88 0.97
1984 2.05 2.00 1.03 2.21 2.05 1.08 1.51 1.62 0.86 2.07 2.16 0.906
1985 2.11 2.18 0.97 2.30 2.22 1.03 1.71 2.07 0.83 2.04 2.08 0.98
Averase
nnual
Growth
Rete 0.10 0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.12 -0.03 0.12 0.12 -0.00
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